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TAKING STOCK:
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ABSTRACT
According to the Veridicality Thesis, information encapsulates truth. An important 
implication of this thesis is that misinformation and disinformation are not types 
of information at all. The first clear formulation of the thesis is provided by Dretske 
(1981). Floridi (2011), a more recent defender of the Veridicality Thesis, offers 
two novel arguments in defense of this thesis. His first argument, the argument 
from splitting, is based on two different usages of adjectives: attributive and pre-
dicative. Floridi claims that ‘false’ in ‘false information’ is used attributively, 
which implies that ‘false information’ is not a kind of information. In his second 
argument, the argument from semantic loss of information, he argues that without 
the Veridicality Thesis it becomes difficult to make sense of the ordinary phenom-
enon of semantic erosion. The literature is lacking in a comprehensive and detailed 
treatment of Floridi’s arguments. In particular, an analysis of his quite lengthy
and technical second argument is lacking. This is what I intend to do in this paper. 
The conclusion of my analysis is, unfortunately, a negative one: neither of the two 
arguments offered by Floridi is strong enough to establish the desired conclusion. 
My analysis shows that the argument from splitting commits a basic fallacy, petitio
principii. As for his second argument, I argue that it is possible to account for seman-
tic erosion even without adopting the truthfulness requirement for information.
In short, my analysis shows that the logical structures of Floridi’s arguments are 
not sufficiently strong enough for establishing the Thesis.
KEYWORDS
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1. Introduction
According to the Veridicality Thesis, information encapsulates truth. That 
is to say, any message with non-truthful content does not carry information. 
Such messages, in Floridi’s words, are nothing but semantic junk. An impor-
tant implication of this thesis is that misinformation and disinformation, 
despite the fact that they are prevalently used in daily life discourses as well 
as in empirical disciplines, are not types of information at all. The main 
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motivations behind the formulation of this thesis are epistemic concerns. 
If acquiring information is going to yield knowledge, then the acquired 
information has to be truthful because truthfulness is a necessary condition 
for knowledge in the traditional analysis of knowledge.
The first clear formulation of the thesis, within the context of theories of 
semantic information, occurred in Dretske’s 1981 book, Knowledgeandthe
Flow of Information. In that book, Dretske starts out with defining the 
informational content of a signal, and uses this definition to explain repre-
sentational notions like ‘seeing that’, ‘believing that’, and ‘knowing that’. 
His definition is as follows.
Informational Content: A signal r carries the information that s is F if and 
only if the conditional probability of s’s being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but, given 
k alone, less than 1) [k refers to background knowledge] (Dretske 1981, p. 65).
Dretske’s chief aim in that book was to construct a theory of knowledge 
based on this definition. Even this aim alone is sufficient to explain why 
Dretske endorsed the Veridicality Thesis, but he also provided three argu-
ments for the thesis. His arguments are specific to the way in which he 
defined informational content in which A carries information that B if and 
only if the conditional probability of B given A (and the background infor-
mation) is 1. His first argument is known as the Xerox Principle, which is 
nothing other than transitivity of information-carrying relations. As it is 
well known, conditional probabilities satisfy transitivity only when the 
 values of those conditional probabilities are 1. Thus, the transitivity of 
information-carrying relations requires that a value of 1 be assigned to the 
conditional probability used in the definition of ‘A carries information 
that B.’ In a similar manner, Dretske claims that if A carries information 
that B and A carries information that C, then A has to carry information 
that (B and C), as well. This property, which Dretske calls the Conjunction 
Principle, is also satisfied only when the conditional probabilities involved 
are assigned values of 1. Dretske’s third argument is that assigning any 
value other than 1 to the conditional probabilities that determine the infor-
mational content of a message would be arbitrary. On the basis of these 
three arguments, he infers that assigning a value of 1 to the conditional 
probabilities involved in his definition of informational content is necessary, 
and thus only truthful content qualifies as informative content. These three 
arguments were the very first arguments offered for the truth encapsulation 
property of information in the literature, and they have been discussed quite 
extensively.1 Thus, I shall not attempt to assess the strength of Dretske’s 
arguments here.
1 Some of the works that discuss Dretske’s arguments are Kyburg (1983), Lehrer and 
Cohen (1983), Loewer (1983), Cohen and Meskin (2006), Demir (2008), Demir (2010).
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The first decade of the 21st century has seen a renewed interest in theories 
of semantic information. It would not be inappropriate to attribute a sig-
nificant portion of this renewed interest to Floridi’s work on the Philosophy 
of Information. Since the mid-1990s, Floridi has been publishing exten-
sively in this area. It is well known that he is an avid defender of the Verid-
icality Thesis, and one of the most crucial features of Floridi’s Philosophy of 
Information is that he offers two novel arguments in defense of this thesis. 
His first argument, the argument from splitting, is based on Geach’s dis-
tinction (1956) between two different usages of adjectives: attributive and 
predicative. To put it briefly, he claims that ‘false’ in ‘false information’ is 
used attributively, which implies that ‘false information’ is not a kind of 
information. Thus, he concludes, information has to be truthful. In his sec-
ond argument, the argument from semantic loss of information, he argues 
that “if false information does not count as semantic junk but as a kind of 
information, it becomes difficult to make sense of the ordinary phenomenon 
of semantic erosion” (Floridi 2011, p. 104).
Floridi’s arguments have been discussed in the literature to an extent2, 
but the literature is lacking in a comprehensive and detailed treatment of 
his arguments. In particular, an analysis of his quite lengthy and technical 
second argument is lacking. This is what I intend to do in this paper. The 
conclusion of my analysis is, unfortunately, a negative one: neither of the 
two arguments offered by Floridi is strong enough to establish the desired 
conclusion. My analysis shows that the argument from splitting commits a 
basic fallacy, petitioprincipii.3 Despite its fallacious nature, however, Flori-
di’s argument is valuable in bringing the Geachean distinction into the 
discussion about the veridical nature of information. The Geachean distinc-
tion may well turn out to have explanatory power for understanding the use 
of ‘false information’ in some contexts. As for his second argument, the 
argument from semantic loss, I argue that it is possible (and not very dif-
ficult) to account for semantic erosion even without adopting the truthful-
ness requirement for information, i.e. the alethic constraint. While doing 
that I only use the assumptions/principles that Floridi himself employs in 
his argument. Because of the possibility of accounting for semantic ero-
sion in an alethically neutral framework, the validity of Floridi’s argument 
from semantic loss becomes questionable. At this point, it is useful to draw 
the boundaries of the implications of my analysis clearly. My analysis of 
Floridi’s two arguments cannot settle the debate on the veridical nature of 
information, because my analysis neither proves nor disproves the Veridicality 
2 Some examples are Fetzer (2004), Sequiah-Grayson (2007), Scarantino and Piccinini 
(2010).
3 My analysis of this argument is similar to Scarantino and Piccinini’s (2010) analysis 
of the same argument. 
120 HILMI DEMIR
Thesis. In other words, the debate on the Veridicality Thesis, even after 
my analysis, is still at a stalemate. My analysis only shows that the logi-
cal structures of Floridi’s arguments are not strong enough for establish-
ing the Thesis. This, of course, does not mean that new arguments for the 
Thesis cannot be constructed on the basis of some of the ideas that Floridi 
uses in his arguments. There is definitely room for that in the logical 
space. 
I start the paper with a brief section on the Philosophy of Information to 
set the stage, and then I proceed to analyze Floridi’s arguments.
2. Philosophy of Information
Philosophy of Information is a newly established subfield of philosophy. 
Although the first appearance of theories of semantic information goes back 
to Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s work (1952), the formulation of the problems, 
methods, and research program that were required for establishment of the 
Philosophy of Information as an autonomous field of philosophy was done 
quite recently. Floridi’s work, which began in the late 1990s and culminated 
in his 2011 book ThePhilosophyofInformation, has been quite influential 
in the process of establishing this field. Although there are several different 
approaches to Philosophy of Information, Floridi’s following definition is 
general enough to be considered as the common denominator accepted by 
all theoreticians of the field.
…PI [is] the new philosophical field concerned with (a) the critical investiga-
tion of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its 
dynamics, utilization and sciences; and (b) the elaboration and application of 
information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical prob-
lems (Floridi 2011, p. 1).
This new field is crucial in offering philosophical analyses of new infor-
mational and computational technologies, but this is not the whole story. 
It also has the potential of providing new ontological and epistemological 
frameworks that can be used for more fundamental philosophical issues. 
For example, Dretske’s information-theoretic epistemology changes the 
focus of the analysis of knowledge from the traditional focus on the inter-
nal state of the knowing organism to the reliable informational connec-
tions between the organism and external states of affairs. In a more or
less similar vein, Floridi’s Philosophy of Information provides a novel 
metaphysical framework in which our understanding of the ultimate 
nature of reality shifts from a materialistic one to an informational one, in 
which all entities, be they natural or artificial, are analyzed as informational 
entities. 
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The central notion of the field of Philosophy of Information is that of 
semantic information. In Floridi’s framework, this notion is defined as well-
formed, meaningful, and truthful data. A datum is understood as a binary 
difference that is nothing but a lack of uniformity. Data are well-formed if 
and only if they are consistent with the syntactical rules of the system and 
become meaningful when an interpretation is provided. The truthfulness 
requirement is the result of the Veridicality Thesis, which states that false 
information is not a genuine kind of information. Let us now turn to Floridi’s 
arguments for this thesis.
3. Floridi’s First Argument – Argument From Splitting
One path that can be taken for deciding whether or not false information is 
a genuine type of information is to compare the use of the adjective ‘false’ 
in ‘false information’ with other uses of the same adjective where we have 
a better understanding of how the adjective ‘false’ is related to the noun 
that follows it. For example, in ‘a false proposition,’ we are clear about the 
nature of the entity in question: it is a proposition that is false. However, 
we are also clear about the nature of the entity in question in ‘a false con-
stable’: someone who is not a constable. One may assess the informational 
status of false information by asking the following question: whether ‘false’ 
in ‘false information’ is similar to ‘false proposition’ or ‘false constable.’ 
In other words, one could proceed with a conceptual clarification of how 
the adjective ‘false’ is used in ‘false information.’ This is the path Floridi 
takes in his first argument.
For conceptual clarification, Floridi uses a logical distinction between 
two types of adjectives introduced by Geach in his analysis of good and 
evil. Here is how Geach explains the distinction: 
My first task will be to draw a logical distinction between two sorts of adjectives, 
suggested by the distinction between attributive adjectives (e.g. a red book) 
and predicative adjectives (e.g. this book is red); I shall borrow this termi-
nology from the grammars. I shall say that in a phrase ‘an A B’ (‘A’ being an 
adjective and ‘B’ being a noun) ‘A’ is a (logically) predicative adjective if the 
predication is ‘an A B’ splits up logically into a pair of predications ‘is a B’ 
and ‘is A’; otherwise I shall say that ‘A’ is a (logically) attributive adjective 
(Geach 1956, p. 33).
‘Male,’ as it is used in ‘a male constable,’ is a predicative adjective, because 
the predication splits up into the following pair: ‘is a male’ and ‘is a con-
stable.’ An example of an attributive adjective is ‘good’ as it is used in ‘a 
good constable.’ In this case, the expression cannot be split up without 
semantic loss. A good constable is not necessarily a good person who is a 
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member of the police force; rather, a ‘good constable’ is someone who 
performs all the tasks of a policeman well.4 Floridi uses this difference 
between predicative and attributive adjectives as a test for deciding whether 
or not false information is a kind of information. He concludes that it is not, 
by the following reasoning: 
When we say that p [a proposition] is false, we are using ‘false’ predicatively. 
The test is that the compound can be split into ‘p is a proposition’ and ‘p is a 
contingent falsehood’ without any semantic loss or confusion. On the contrary, 
when we describe p [a proposition] as false information, we are using ‘false’ 
attributively, to negate the fact that p qualifies as information at all. Why? 
Because ‘false information’ does not pass the test. As in the case of the false 
constable, the compound cannot be correctly split….. If false information were 
a genuine type of information it should pass the splitting test. It does not,
so it is not (Floridi 2011, p. 98).
Thus, Floridi’s reasoning continues, since information has to be truthful, 
the Veridicality Thesis is true.
This reasoning, however, is a clear case of petitioprincipii. Consider the 
following three statements. 
(1) Information encapsulates truth (the Veridicality Thesis).
(2) False information is not a kind of information.
(3) ‘False information’ cannot be split up without semantic loss.
I take it to be obvious that (1) is logically equivalent to (2). (2) is also 
logically equivalent to (3), because if false information is a kind of infor-
mation, then ‘false information’ could be split up, as in the case of ‘false 
proposition,’ without any semantic loss. It is clear from the quote above 
that Floridi uses (3) as a premise in his reasoning. His reasoning aims to 
prove first (2) and then (1). Since (3) is logically equivalent to both (1) and 
(2), Floridi’s reasoning is an instance of begging the question.
Despite its circularity and its failure to achieve its goal, however, Floridi’s 
argument from splitting is not completely useless. In some contexts, ‘false’ 
in ‘false information’ seems to be used as a negation in a natural way 
(similarly, at least in some contexts the prefix ‘mis’ in ‘misinformation’ seems 
to act like a negation)5. The Geachean distinction that Floridi employs in his 
argument may shed light on how and why the ‘false’ in ‘false information’ 
4 It should be noted that Geach intended his categorization to be a categorization of 
adjectives. Floridi changes the original categorization and treats it as a categorization of 
different uses of adjectives, because he claims that at least some adjectives can be used both 
attributively and predicatively depending on the context (Floridi 2011, p. 97). Floridi’s dif-
ferent treatment of the original categorization, however, has no significant bearing on his 
argument or on my analysis of his argument. 
5 This naturalness of using ‘false’ as a negation in ‘false information’ in some contexts 
is explained by Michael Dunn (2008) by appealing to pragmatics. In his view, in actual 
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seems to be acting like a negation in some contexts. However, this potential 
use of the Geachean distinction does not undermine the fact that the par-
ticular argument that Floridi offers in defense of the Veridicality Thesis
is circular. It is, of course, still logically possible to construct a different 
argument for the Veridicality Thesis based on the Geachean distinction. 
My analysis above only shows that Floridi’s particular argument cannot 
serve this purpose. In other words, the implications of my analysis are 
limited; it neither proves nor disproves the Veridicality Thesis. It only 
shows that proponents of the Veridicality Thesis need an argument different 
than Floridi’s argument from splitting. 
4.  Floridi’s Second Argument: Argument From Semantic Loss of Infor-
mation
In his second argument, Floridi attempts to provide, in a sense, an indirect 
proof of the Veridicality Thesis. The following quote gives us a short and 
concise description of the structure of his argument. 
[T]he general strategy of the argument…is indirect and basically reverses the 
steps that would be taken in ‘slippery slope’ reasoning. We shall begin by 
assuming that opponents of the veridical nature of information are correct. 
We shall then see that this is too permissive: too many items slip in. We shall 
then make the definition progressively tighter, until only the items that we 
wish to include in the definition of information are actually captured, and all 
the counterintuitive consequences are avoided. At that stage, we shall realize 
that we have endorsed the veridicality thesis itself (Ibid., p. 99). 
In his indirect proof, Floridi starts by assuming that the set of all proposi-
tions is identical to the set of information-carrying propositions. Under 
this assumption, any proposition, be it necessarily true, necessarily false, 
or contingently true/false, would qualify for having informational content. 
A corollary of this assumption is that the Veridicality Thesis is false, 
because even contingently false propositions qualify for having informa-
tional content. Floridi claims that this assumption is too permissive; many 
items that do not qualify for carrying information slip in, and it also allows 
the adding of mutually inconsistent propositions into the stock information, 
thus generating a contradictory repository of information (Ibid., p. 101). 
In order to show these obviously implausible consequences of the assump-
tion, which implies the opposite of the Veridicality Thesis, Floridi uses four 
fundamental principles that he claims to be “uncontroversial and fairly 
usage of ‘information’ we expect it to be truthful, but this expectation is not a part of the 
semantics of information; rather, it is a part of its pragmatics. 
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standard assumptions in information theory and in the philosophy of 
information” (Ibid., p. 99). These four principles are stated below after an 
explanation of the notation used in their formulations.
D:  domain of all propositions 
S:  domain of instances of information 
μ and φ: propositional variables ranging over D 
H(φ):  primary informative content of φ 
x: variable ranging overS
P(x):  probability of x 
All other symbols are symbols of classical logic and naïve set theory.
P.1  ∀xH(x)  ≥  0, principleofthenon-negativenatureofinformation: 
no instance of information can have negative primary informative 
content. 
P.2  ∀x∀y ((x  ≠  y)→ (H(x  ∪  y)=H(x)+H(y))), additive principle: 
for any two different instances of information, their overall inform-
ative content is equal to the sum of their informative contents.
P.3  ∀φ(P(φ)  =  1)→(H(φ)  =  0), inverserelationprinciple: any propo-
sition whose probability is 1 has no informative content.
P.4  ∀φ(H(φ)  =  0)→¬ (φ  ∈  S): any proposition with no informative 
content fails to qualify as information.
It should be noted that, for now, I accept these principles, which are clearly 
stated by Floridi (Ibid., p. 98-99), without questioning in order to assess the 
internal logical structure of his argument. But as we will see in the following 
sections, contrary to what Floridi claims, they are neither “fairly standard” 
nor “uncontroversial”. For example, P.2 is not the complete specification 
of theadditiveprinciple. In its complete specification, P.2 holds only for 
independent propositions. For propositions that are not independent from 
each other, or in other words for propositions with overlapping informative 
content, the overall informational content of X and Y is the sum of the 
informational content of X and the informational content of Y minus the 
overlapping informational content (Cover and Thomas 1991, p. 19). In short, 
in the way it is formulated above, P.2 is incomplete and this incompleteness 
makes it quite counterintuitive, if not false. As another example, P.3, which 
directly implies that tautologies have no informational content, is not a 
commonly accepted principle, either. For example, in the literature, there 
are now new theories of information based on relevant logics in which 
tautologies are treated as having informational content6. For now, however, 
6 I would like to thank the anonymous referee who brought this point to my attention.
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let us leave these criticisms aside and proceed with our analysis of Floridi’s 
argument.
Given the four principles stated above, Floridi attempts to prove that 
equating S (the set of instances of information) with D(the set of all prop-
ositions) is too permissive in five steps. At each step, he examines one 
category of the members of S and ‘proves’ that they should not belong
to S. In the next step, he excludes the category of the members from the 
previous step, the members of S that do not qualify as being instances
of information, and moves on the next category. After the five steps are 
completed, the items remaining in set S are those that properly qualify for 
carrying informative content. The members remaining in set S, in Floridi’s 
proof, are just contingently true propositions, and only the members of S 
qualify for having informative content. Thus, he concludes, the Veridicality 
Thesis is proven.
The next section summarizes the five steps of Floridi’s proof. Naturally, 
in the summary, I have omitted most of the formal details of his proof. 
I have also taken the liberty of adding some new symbolizations and giving 
some examples for clarification purposes. None of these omissions or addi-
tions, however, affects the essence of Floridi’s reasoning. 
4.1. Floridi’s Proof
Assumption: The set of instances of information is identical to the set of 
all propositions. 
Corollary: The Veridicality Thesis is false because even contingently false 
propositions are in the set of instances of information. In other words, false 
information is a genuine type of information.
Premises: The four fundamental principles of information theory, P.1 – P.4.
Step 1: Since the probability of a tautology is 1, P.3 implies that tautologies 
do not have informative content, but since S, the set of instances of infor-
mation, has tautologies in it, it is too permissive. 
Step 2 (excluding tautologies): Fixing the problem identified in Step 1 
requires that the tautologies be excluded from set S. Let S1 be the new set 
of instances of information and T be the set of tautologies such that S1=
S\T.
S1 includes contradictory propositions as instances of information, but 
this is quite counterintuitive, says Floridi, because under this assumption, 
receiving a contradictory message about an event may increase the amount 
of information that one receives about the outcome of the event. Thus, con-
tradictions have to be excluded from S1. 
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Step 3 (excluding contradictions): Step 2 requires us to exclude contra-
dictions from S1. Let S2 be the new set of instances of information and
C be the set of contradictions; then S2=S1\C=S\(T∪C).
S2 is still too permissive, according to Floridi, because the corollary that 
false information is a genuine type of information together with P.2 implies 
that the informative content of a repository of information increases by 
adding a proposition that may be inconsistent with one of the members of 
the repository. To clarify, take two information repositories, one of which 
has only one member, Q, in it, and the other of which has two: QandR. 
Furthermore, assume that QandR are mutually inconsistent. Because of 
the corollary that false information is a genuine kind of information, both 
QandR count as instances of information. Because of P.2, however, the 
latter information repository has more informative content than the former 
one. However, the latter repository is an inconsistent one. This is implausible; 
an inconsistent information repository must not have more informative con-
tent than a consistent one.
Step 4 (excluding inconsistencies): In order to avoid the implausible con-
sequence identified in Step 3, inconsistencies have to be excluded from S2 
so that the new set of instances of information is consistent. Let S3 be the 
new set of instances of information and I be the set of some or all7 members 
of S2 that make S2inconsistent; then S3=S2\I=S\(T∪C∪I). 
For evaluating S3, Floridi focuses on the possible ways of information 
loss, i.e. losing informative content. At this stage, says Floridi, an informa-
tion repository may lose information mainly by syntactical means in the 
following way.
Imagine receiving first the proposition that p and then the proposition that ¬ p. 
If you are unable to assess which message is reliable, the new proposition
p0 ¬ p has no informative content (Ibid., p. 102). 
To exemplify Floridi’s ideas, let Z be an information repository that has 
only 2 members: Q and R. Suppose that a new member ¬ R is added to the 
repository, but there is no evidence about as to the reliability of the source 
that R is received from or the source that ¬ R is received from. Thus, accord-
ing to Floridi, the new repository becomes Q and R0 ¬ R in it. Since the 
second member is a tautology, it has to be removed from the database 
7 Floridi does not specify a particular way of excluding inconsistencies. One may 
exclude all the members involved in the inconsistency or some of them; any of these ways 
is compatible with Floridi’s consistency requirement as long as the set that is the outcome 
of the revision is consistent. Thus, I shall take into account all possible ways of revising a 
database for making it consistent. Floridi’s consistency requirement is stated as a part of 
equation [9] on page 103 of his 2010 book. I would like to thank the anonymous referee who 
brought this point to my attention.
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because of Step 2. Thus, the new repository has only Q in it. Since both Q 
and R have non-zero informative content, the original repository, which has 
Q and R in it, has more informative content than the new one given the 
additiveprinciple, P.2. This is a case of loss of information by syntactic 
means. For a satisfactory theory of semantic information, however, allow-
ing loss of information by syntactical means is necessary but not sufficient, 
because, as rightly pointed out by Floridi, “information loss can occur by 
negation, falsification and by making propositions satisfiable by all possible 
worlds,” as well (Ibid., p. 103). Information loss in such cases occurs due 
to semantic reasons, not syntactic ones. At this stage, however, Floridi 
claims, the set of instances of information, S3, does not allow the possibility 
of loss of information by semantic means. To give an example, take Z 
stated above, which has Q and R in it. When Q is falsified, the repository 
must lose information, but since the Veridicality Thesis is denied, Q still 
counts as an instance of information. Therefore, it still has to stay in Z. 
Since the members of the repository are the same, the informative content 
of Z remains the same even after the falsification of Q, but there has to be 
loss of information in Z, and this loss of information is not due to syntactic 
reasons; it is due to semantic means. From this reasoning, Floridi concludes 
that S3 has to be revised so that information loss by semantic means is also 
accounted for. 
Step 5 (excluding contingent falsehoods): To fix the problem identified 
in Step 4, Floridi puts an alethic constraint on instances of information;
to wit, only contingently true propositions qualify as being instances of 
information. The following is Floridi’s formalization of the required alethic 
constraint.
∀φ ((φ  ∈  S)→t(φ))  
where t(φ)=φis contingently true. 
Under this constraint, says Floridi, “informative content can easily decrease 
(one merely need to generate an inconsistency or a falsehood).”8 Thus, 
given the alethic constraint, contingent falsehoods have to be excluded from 
8 Floridi’s claim here naturally calls for the question of how semantic information is being 
quantified. As it is well known by now, Floridi has a complex methodology for quantifying 
semantic information. His methodology is based on notions like semantic deviation, inaccu-
racy, and vacuity. However, he does not employ that quantification of semantic information 
in his argument from semantic loss. This can easily be seen from the fact that in Floridi’s 
ThePhilosophyof Information, the methodology is first explained in a chapter after the 
chapter in which the argument from semantic loss is stated. In his argument from semantic 
loss, as the short quote in the text suggests, he operates with the following: a proper subset 
of a set has less informative content than the set itself simply because of having a lesser 
cardinality. This is a direct result of the additivity principle, P.2, which is one of the four 
fundamental principles that Floridi uses in his proof.
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set S3. Let S4 be the new set of instances of information and F be the set of 
contingent falsehoods; then S4=S3 \F=S\(T ∪ C ∪ I ∪ F). Nothing 
but only contingently true propositions are members of S4. This means that 
anything that qualifies as having informative content must be contingently 
true. Thus, according to Floridi, the Veridicality Thesis is true, because
the alethic constraint “is just another way of formulating the veridicality 
thesis” (Ibid., p. 104).
4.2. Assessment of Floridi’s Proof
In Step 1 and Step 2 of his argument, Floridi seems to be right in conclud-
ing that tautologies and contradictions have to be excluded from the set of 
instances of information. After all, most theories of semantic information 
treat tautologies as completely uninformative and treat contradictions as not 
qualifying for having informative content9. The conclusion of his Step 3, 
that inconsistencies must be excluded, is also to the point, but the reasoning 
that he provides for it is faulty. The reasoning presented in Step 4 is not 
justified, either, because it ignores the conclusions derived from Steps 1, 2, 
and 3 of his proof.
 In Step 3, Floridi claims that the additive principle together with the 
rejection of the Veridicality Thesis implies that adding a proposition that
is mutually inconsistent with one of the previous members increases the 
informative content of an information repository. The reasoning here is 
based on a specification of the additiveprinciple that is incomplete. In other 
words, P.2 is not the correct formulation of the additiveprinciple. Here is 
the correct statement of the principle, as quoted from van der Lubbe’s Infor-
mationTheory.10
H(P) is additive. If X and Y are two sample spaces, where outcomes in X are 
independent of those in Y, then we find for the information relating to joint 
events (xi,yi )
H( p1q1, …,  p1qm, …,  pn q1, …,  pn qm)=H( p1, …,  pn)  +  H( q1, …,  qm)
[where pi and qi are the probabilities of the outcomes of the events X and Y, 
respectively] (van der Lubbe 1997, p. 10).
9 It should be noted that, in the literature, there are now new theories of information in 
which the situation is different. For example, in theories of information based on paracon-
sistent logics some contradictions have informative content and in theories based on relevant 
logics tautologies can be informative.
10 Floridi also cites van der Lubbe’s book in supporting his claim that the four principles, 
P.1-P.4, that he uses in his proof are fairly standard assumptions in information theory 
(Floridi 2011, p. 99).
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This formulation, which is defined by using events as fundamental units 
and can easily be rephrased by using propositions instead, clearly implies 
that the additiveprinciple does not apply to mutually inconsistent propo-
sitions, because mutually inconsistent propositions are not independent of 
each other.11 Thus, contrary to what Floridi claims, the rejection of the 
Veridicality Thesis together with the additive principle does not imply 
that adding mutually inconsistent propositions increases the informative 
content of an information repository. This, however, does not mean that 
Floridi’s conclusion in Step 3 is not true. Inconsistencies have to be 
excluded from the set of instances of information, but the reason for this 
is that the conjunction of two inconsistent propositions in a repository is 
false in all possible worlds,12 which amounts to a contradiction, and at 
least one of the propositions that lead to inconsistency has to be excluded 
from the set because of the conclusion of Step 2. Therefore, the conclu-
sion of Step 3 is true, but for different reasons than the ones provided by 
Floridi.
In Step 4, as stated above, Floridi lists 4 avenues of semantic loss of 
information, which are not possible before excluding contingent falsehoods 
according to him. These are: (i) by making propositions inconsistent,
(ii) by making propositions satisfiable by all possible worlds, (iii) by negating 
propositions, and (iv) by falsifying propositions (I have changed Floridi’s 
original order for the ease of presentation). Let me analyze each of these 
four types of semantic information loss to see if they are possible without 
excluding contingent falsehoods from the set of instances of information. 
In all of the examples, an information repository, Z, with two members, Q
and R, is used.
(i) Making a proposition inconsistent: Suppose that one of the members 
of the repository, R, is made inconsistent with the other member, Q. Floridi 
is quite right in expecting a loss of information in Z after making R incon-
sistent with Q. Contrary to what he claims, however, there is a semantic loss 
of information in this case, even with the set of instances of information 
stated in Step 4. This is because R and Q are mutually inconsistent after the 
operation, and so some or all of the members that lead to inconsistency 
have to be removed from Z because of the conclusion derived in Step 3. 
Now, depending on the revision function, one may remove both members 
(R and Q) that are involved in the inconsistency or one may remove only 
11 It is quite straightforward to show that two mutually inconsistent propositions are not 
independent by using the independence criterion in the classic probability theory: A and B 
are independent from each other if and only if P(A/B)=P(A) and P(B/A)=P(B).
12 My reasoning here is quite similar to Dretske’s Conjunction Principle (1981), which 
is briefly stated in the introduction. 
130 HILMI DEMIR
one of them (R or Q)13. In both cases, the resultant repository would be 
consistent. Thus, we have three possible resultant repositories after revising 
the repository to make it consistent. Let me state the situation before and 
after revision in more formal terms.
Z1is Z before making R inconsistent with Q:
Z1 = {Q,R} 
The informative content of Z1 is H(Q)+H(R), when Q and R have no 
overlapping content14.
The informative content of Z1 is H(Q)+H(R)–H(R, Q), when Q and 
R have overlapping content, which is H(R,Q)15.
Z2is Z after making R inconsistent with Q and after removing the inconsist-
ency:
1.  Z2={} when both Q and R removed. The informative content of Z2 
is 0.
2. Z2={Q} when R removed. The informative content of Z2 is H(Q). 
3. Z2 = {R} when Q removed. The informative content of Z2 is H(R). 
Because of the principleofthenon-negativenatureofinformation, i.e. P.1, 
we know that H(Q), H(R) ≥ 0. We also know that Q and R are neither 
 tautologies nor contradictions (these possibilities are ruled out because of 
the previous Steps 2 and 3 of Floridi’s proof). Thus, both Q and R have 
non-zero informative content. Given this, it is an arithmetical fact that in 
all three possible cases Z2 has less informative content than Z1. Thus, there 
is semantic loss of information after making a proposition inconsistent, and 
this loss of information does not require excluding the contingent false-
hoods from the set of instances of information.
(ii) Making a proposition satisfiable by all possible worlds: Suppose 
that one of the members of the repository, say R, is made satisfiable by all 
possible worlds. Again, one would expect a loss of information in the 
repository. Does the set of instances of information stated in Step 4 allow 
for such a loss? Actually, the answer is yes. In such a situation, R becomes 
no different than a tautology16 and has to be excluded from Zbecause of 
13 As stated in footnote 7, Floridi does not specify a particular revision function in his 
argument. Any function that removes inconsistency is compatible with Floridi’s require-
ments. Thus, I examine all possible revision functions. This naturally makes the informative 
content of an information repository relative to a revision function. 
14 This is just an application of the correct specification of the additiveprinciple, i.e. P.2.
15 Please see the version of the additive principle for propositions with overlapping 
content, stated on page 9.
16 The probability of a statement that is satisfiable by all possible worlds is 1, and by 
P.3. it has no informative content.
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the conclusion of Step 1. Before the operation, say, at time t1, the repository 
has Q and R, and at t1, R is not satisfiable by all possible worlds, which 
means that R has non-zero informative content. After the operation of mak-
ing R satisfiable by all possible worlds, say, at time t2, the repository would 
have only Qin it. Now by the same reasoning presented in (i), the revised 
repository after making R satisfiable by all possible worlds (i.e. Z2={Q}) 
has less informative content than the repository before the operation (i.e.
Z1 ={Q,R}). Thus, there is semantic loss of information here, as well no 
requirement for the exclusion of contingent falsehoods from the set of 
instances of information.
(iii) Negating a proposition: Suppose that one of the members of the 
repository, R, is negated. The original repository has Q and R, and the new 
repository after the operation has Q and not-R. Since we do not know 
anything about the relative informative contents of R and not-R, for now, 
let us assume that they have the same amount of informative content. 
Under this assumption, both repositories have the same informative con-
tent; thus, there is no loss of information here after negating R. However, 
it is absurd to expect a loss of information in this case, because both R and 
not-R are assumed to have the same amount of informative content. One 
should therefore not expect a loss of information by negating R. As an 
example, assume that R stands for “the outcome of flipping a coin at time 
t1 is heads.” Once this is negated, it becomes, “the outcome of flipping a 
coin at time t1 is not heads,” which is equivalent to “the outcome of flipping 
a coin at time t1 is tails.” Do we expect a loss of information in the repos-
itory if “the outcome of flipping a coin at time t1 is heads” was just 
replaced with “the outcome of flipping that coin at time t1 is tails”? The 
answer seems to be a clear NO, because both the original statement and 
its negation have the same amount of informative content. Thus, expecting 
a loss of information from negating a member of an information reposi-
tory, when their informative contents are equal, is not right. Now, what if 
the informative content of R is greater than the informative content of 
not-R? In this case, it is clear that there is semantic loss of information 
because R is replaced with a proposition that has less informative content. 
As the last case, what if the informative content of not-R is greater than 
R’s? In this case, actually, there is an increase in semantic information, 
which is only to be expected because R is replaced with another proposition 
that has more informative content. So, to expect loss of information in this 
situation is unjustified. As a result, we can conclude that cases of negating 
propositions do not present a problem for the set of instances of information 
stated in Step 4, either.
(iv) Falsifying a proposition: Suppose that one of the members of the 
repository, R, is falsified. We cannot take R out of the repository, because 
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of R being false. In Step 4, the set of instances of information still includes 
contingent falsehoods. Thus, despite the fact that R is falsified, we still have 
to keep it in the repository. This is why Floridi says that semantic loss of 
information by falsifying propositions cannot occur in Step 4. Now, what 
does it mean to falsify a member of an information repository? Or, what 
are the ways of falsifying a member of an information repository? It seems 
that there are only two ways: either you would add “R is false” or you 
would add “not-R is true” to the information repository. Both of these 
options, however, amount to adding not-R to the repository. This is because 
both of those additions logically imply that not-R. Thus, after falsifying R, 
the new repository ends up having three elements: Q, R, and not-R. This
is an inconsistent repository, and something has to be removed from the 
repository to make it consistent. As stated in (i), there are three ways of 
doing this depending on the choice of revision function: either to remove 
both R and not-R, or to remove only one of them. If both are removed, then, 
by the reasoning presented in (i), there is definitely semantic loss of infor-
mation. If only not-R is removed, then there is no loss of information 
because the repository stays the same. To expect loss of information in this 
case, however, is not justified at all, because the repository stays the same 
as if the falsifying operation has never occurred. As the third and the
last case, if only R is removed, then the situation becomes identical to the 
one analyzed in (iii), i.e. comparing {Q,R} and {Q,not-R}. By the same 
reasoning presented there, we can conclude that this case does not justify 
the move that Floridi wants to make, either, i.e. excluding contingent false-
hoods in order to account for semantic erosion.
The ultimate conclusion of the above analysis is that none of the four 
types of semantic loss of information listed by Floridi justifies the move 
that he makes in Step 5 of his proof, which is to exclude contingent false-
hoods from the set of instances of information. If that is the case, however, 
set S3, stated in Step 4 of his proof, remains satisfactory for a theory of 
semantic information. That set, S3, excludes only tautologies, contradic-
tions, and inconsistencies from the set of all propositions, and it includes 
all contingent propositions. In other words, contingently false propositions 
as well as contingently true propositions still count as genuine instances of 
information, even after the ordinary phenomenon of semantic erosion is 
accounted for. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have critically examined Floridi’s arguments for the Verid-
icality Thesis and concluded that neither of his arguments is strong enough 
for establishing his desired goal. My charge against the first argument is 
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that it commits a basic fallacy, petitioprincipii. For his second argument, 
I have argued that accepting his principles/assumptions does not force us 
to accept the conclusion of his argument. In order to justify my claim, I have 
shown that it is quite possible to account for semantic erosion even within 
an alethically neutral framework. While doing that, I have only used the 
four informational principles that Floridi himself employs in his argument. 
It is perhaps worthwhile to state that I could have formulated my criticism 
by using the inverse relationship between the probability of a proposition 
and its informative content. I shunned away from doing that, because Flori-
di’s alethic theory of semantic information is based on the criticism of a 
seemingly paradoxical implication of the probability-based theories of 
information. He calls this implication the Bar-Hillel and Carnap Paradox 
(BCP), because its first clear appearance was in Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s 
theory of semantic information. In that theory, contradictions carry the most 
inclusive informative content. After identifying this paradox, Floridi concludes 
that to avoid this paradox requires adopting a theory of semantic informa-
tion based on the truthfulness of information, because the paradox is a 
result of defining information instances with probability values17. There-
fore, it would have been unfair if I had formulated my criticism in terms of 
the inverse relationship between probabilities and informative content18.
Floridi’s analysis of the BCP is also the basis of his exclusion of contra-
dictions from the set of instances of information. For him, assigning any 
informative content to contradictions leads to the BCP. At this point, it 
should be mentioned that there are alternative ways of treating contradic-
tions that do not lead to the BCP. For example, in some theories of informa-
tion that are based on relevant logics contradictions are treated as non-
trivial without leading to a paradox. Throughout the paper, I have assumed 
that tautologies and contradictions have no informative content, as Floridi 
does. My purpose for doing so was to assess the internal logical structure 
17 It should be noted that what Floridi calls the BCP may not be as paradoxical as he 
makes it to be. In Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory of semantic information, there are three 
theorems about contradictions that could be interpreted as paradoxical (T4-2.b, T6-4.c and 
T7-8.c in Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1952). The first two of those theorems imply that contradic-
tions carry the most inclusive content. This implication is not directly related with defining 
information on probability values. Rather, it is a direct result of defining informational 
inclusion via material implication. As is known, in classical logic, anything follows from a 
contradiction. So, the first two theorems of Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory are as ‘paradoxical’ 
as the fact that in classical logic anything follows from a contradiction. The third theorem 
is directly related to defining information with probability values, and the theorem states 
that contradictions carry an infinite amount of information. This is very paradoxical, and it 
is perhaps this theorem that motivated the formulation of the BCP. However, a careful 
examination shows that this is NOT actually a theorem of Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory. 
Bar-Hillel and Carnap simply made an arithmetical mistake! In that theorem, the amount of 
semantic information assigned to contradictions must be left undefined. 
18 I would like to thank the anonymous referee who brought this point to my attention.
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of Floridi’s arguments; it was not a strong endorsement of Floridi’s view 
of contradictions. On the contrary, I do think that exploring alternative 
ways of treating contradictions (and tautologies, for that matter) is quite
a promising line of research that will surely enrich the literature on the 
Philosophy of Information. 
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